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Risk Management in the Area 
of Major Industrial Accident 




The SEVESO II and III Directives relate to approximately 12,000 EU establish-
ments working with the hazardous substances. The majority of EU member states 
implement new requirements of the SEVESO III Directive to their legal environment. 
The third revision goes hand in hand with the enforcement of the CLP legislation, 
concerning the Classification, Labelling and Packaging of chemical substances and 
mixtures. Risk Management is appearing as one of the most important challenges 
nowadays to raise the prevention level in these establishments. The book chapter 
analyses the industrial accidents and identified consequences and impacts whose 
results can be implemented to the effective prevention. The benefit of this chapter is 
the summarisation of the legal regulations, information systems and especially the 
statistics of the industrial accidents in Slovakia and the EU. The risk assessment is one 
of the problem areas of prevention therefore, it was necessary to present the methods 
and techniques utilised here and to clarify the approach used in the Slovak Republic. 
The programme ALOHA is most frequently used for modelling the consequences and 
therefore we presented its possible utilisation on a particular example at the end of 
this article. The main goal of this chapter is to show how is important to proceed risk 
management in establishments with hazardous substances is, what kind of methods 
should be use here to decrease risks and possibilities for modelling its impacts.
Keywords: risk management, industrial accidents, prevention, Seveso, Slovakia, 
modelling
1. Introduction
The major industrial accidents are phenomena whose effects threaten the human 
lives, property and environment. The EU decided to solve this problem in 1982 
through the legal tool known as SEVESO I that has been amended three times so far. 
Currently the SEVESO III Directive is valid and in 2015 Slovakia issued a law about 
the major industrial accident prevention as amended. These legal regulations deter-
mine the rules for handling with hazardous substances and fulfilling procedures 
connected with their handling procedures in the companies exceeding the amounts 
defined by the law. The transposition of the new SEVESO III Directive has created 




The major industrial accident (MIA) prevention is a specific topic for preventing, 
planning and solving the crisis phenomena not only in Slovakia but also on the inter-
national level. In spite of the fact that in most EU countries, in the years 2008–2018 
there was a decrease in the number of people injured in accidents at work and in fatal 
accidents in industrial processes, it is necessary to pay attention to this area [1, 2].
The risk management that consists of the risk assessment and risk treatment is 
one of the most important pillars of preventing the accident development [3]. The 
great amount of approaches, methods and techniques in this area make it often cha-
otic, however, the most substantial assumption is to understand the philosophy of 
assessing and managing the risks the how to implement it. The calculation mecha-
nisms and formulae serve only as an aid for defining the risk and determining its 
acceptability or unacceptability. The objective of this chapter was the clarification 
of the procedures that will be understandable and usable [4–6].
This chapter deals with MIA prevention concerning only the SEVESO III  
companies. The under-threshold establishments are not taken into account.
The following information was taken into consideration for analysing the  
accidents:
• The number of injured/dead people and damages of the property,
• The accident during the validity of the SEVESO I,  
II and III.
The data collection process also utilised the semi-structured interviews with the 
employees of the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic and the Slovak 
Environment Agency. The databases collecting the data about the MIAs accord-
ing to the classification life/health, property and environment were analysed for 
identifying the causes and effects.
In the framework of the case study, we utilised the on-site observations and 
subsequently the software for simulating the consequences and impacts.
2. Industrial accident prevention
The constant increasing of the technological progress brings also development  
of the industrial accidents more and more frequently. The industrial accidents 
belong to the anthropogenic phenomena whose occurrence can be determined with a 
certain probability. The need of its legal adaptation became inevitable in the 1980s.
Bahr says that the accident is an unplanned development of events that lead to 
undesirable injuries, losses of lives, to damaging the property and environment. He 
also declares that it is necessary to differentiate the so called near-miss – the nuclear 
accident Three Mile Island can serve here as an example. During this crisis phenom-
enon not that big amount of radioactivity penetrated to the environment that would 
have threatened the lives of the citizens, however, the investigation showed a lot of 
shortages that drew lessons from this near-miss [7].
Marvin Rausand says that during the recent decades a lot of large accidents have 
drawn attention of the general public to the need of increasing the awareness about the 
risks that are connected with the technological systems and activities. The industrial 
accidents also affected the stance of the competent authorities concerning the safety 
in this area. The companies themselves are also aware of the need of implementing the 
principles of an effective prevention in the enterprises especially in connection with 
the high financial costs and losses of lives in the case an accident develops. The Table 1 
brings examples of major accidents with hazardous substances (HS) [8].
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In spite of the negative effects and impacts, these accidents give us precious 
information for improving the prevention effectiveness in this area.
The overview in the Table 1 was created from a file including the accidents and it 
should serve as a reminder that safety must never be on the second place and also the 
risks with a low probability bring frequently serious impacts. Macza analyses some 
of these accidents and the responses and perception of the society to each of them in 
connection with the changes of the legal regulations and other interactions [11].
In the further text we will deal only with accidents in the chemical enterprises 
that utilise hazardous substances in their processes.
Ostrom says in his book that several types of the primary and secondary crisis 
phenomena can develop in the industrial operations working with hazardous 
substances. They can cause an accident with the following consequence:
• the leakage of a hazardous substance outside the plant (small or large),
• the leakage of a hazardous substance in the plant (small or large),
• the fire or explosion (small or large),
• the injuries of the employees (acute, chronic),
• the traffic accident in the company,
• the terrorist activity,
• the secondary ones (e.g. damaging the company’s reputation) [12].
The industrial accidents are connected especially with the uncontrolled leakage 
and spreading the hazardous substances that threat the life and health of people, 
damage the property and pollute the environment [13]. The hazardous substances 
causing the industrial accidents are of the chemical or radioactive origin and can 
come either from disrupting the stability of the stationary source of the hazard-
ous substance (production of the equipment, warehouses, equipment using the 
hazardous substance in the process) or the mobile sources (cars or railway carriages 
determined for transporting the hazardous substances) [14].
In the EU framework there are different legal regulations for the nuclear and 
chemical premises that are subsequently transposed to the legal system of the 
member states. Just the development of the industrial accidents and investigating 
their causes aroused the efforts to adapt the given area through the legal regulations 
and thorough inspection in this field (see the Table 2).
The aforementioned accidents were the principal milestones for creating the 
safety standards of the industrial processes and application of the changes in the 
SEVESO Directive framework.
2.1 Industrial accident prevention
2.1.1 Prevention of major industrial accidents in the EU
2.1.1.1  The legal environment in the area of prevention of major industrial 
accidents in the EU
The afore-mentioned industrial accidents as well as a whole range of others 
showed the failure of the technology and operators that caused the death of a lot of 
Risk Management
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Place of the 
accident
Year Effects Impacts
Seveso, Italy 1976 Leakage of dioxin to 
atmosphere
2,000 poisoned people, 
environment pollution, mass 
evacuation
The North Sea, 
Norway
1977 Leakage of crude oil from oil 
platform
Significant sea pollution
Three Mile Island, 
USA
1979 Near-miss, a potential for 
leaking a larger amount of 
radioactivity
Without any serious impacts
Bhopal, India 1984 Leakage of toxic methyl 
isocyanate
3,800 dead people, 20,000 injured 
people, 200,000 evacuated people
Mexico City, 
Mexico
1984 Explosion and fire of LPG 
container with subsequent 
pressure wave,
500 dead people, material damages
Basel, Switzerland 1986 Leakage of chemicals from the 
Sandoz plant to the Rhein river
River contamination, serious 
environmental damage, cross-
border impacts
Zeebrugge, Belgium 1987 Accident of the British tanker 
Herald of Free Enterprise
209 dead people, material damages
The North Sea, UK 1988 Explosion and fire on the oil 
platform “Piper Alpha”
167 dead people, extensive damage
Pasadena, USA 1989 Explosion and fire with 
subsequent pressure wave and 
heat radiation
23 dead and 100 injured people
The Baltic Sea 1994 Overturning the ferry Estonia 853 dead people, serious 
environmental damage
Longford, Australia 1998 Explosion and fire with 
subsequent pressure wave and 
heat radiation
2 dead people, Melbourne without 
gas for 19days
Brittany, France 1999 Sinking the tanker Erika with 
extensive leakage of HS to the 
sea
Extensive leakage of oil substances 
to the sea and its pollution
Enschede, the 
Netherlands
2000 Explosion and pressure wave 
in the company for pyrotechnic 
production
22 dead people, 1,000 injured 
people, more than 300 destroyed 
houses
Toulouse, France 2001 Explosion and fire with 
subsequent pressure wave and 
heat radiation
30 people dead, 2,000 injured 
people, 600 destroyed houses
Galicia, Spain 2002 Sinking the tanker Prestige 
with extensive leakage of HS 
to the sea
Extensive leakage of oil substances 
to the sea and its pollution
Texas, USA 2005 Explosion and fire with 
subsequent pressure wave and 
heat radiation
15 dead people, 180 injured people
Hertfordshire, 
Great Britain
2005 Explosion and fire with 
subsequent pressure wave and 
heat radiation
43 injured people, extensive 
damage
Gulf of Mexico 2010 Explosion of the oil rig 
Deepwater Horizon
11 dead people, 17 injured people, 
destroyed equipment, leakage of 
oil slick to the sea
Great Britain 2013 Explosions and a fire on a slab 
casting machine in a steel works
Damage to property more than 2 
mil.Euros, 12 injuries
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people or the accident effects caused them durable consequences for their health 
and losses of the material values and the environment that can be of a long-term 
character but also irreversible. Therefore the number one issue is the prevention of 
such events and the implementation of the preventive measures in the industrial 
environment. The EU tries to regulate this environment and to determine the rules 
for the companies that are the most dangerous ones from the point of view of the 
hazardous substances concentration. The SEVESO Directive is such a tool – it has 
been amended several times and currently the SEVESO III Directive is valid.
The SEVESO III Directive creates the basic framework dealing with the preven-
tion of and preparedness for overcoming the major industrial accidents of hazard-
ous substances. Due to the rapid technological development and globalisation the 
updating process of this directive is under way in certain time intervals – from the 
SEVESO I to SEVESO III Directives. The overview of the most important updating 
of this directive is as follows:
• Council Directive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on the major-accident hazards 
of certain industrial activities (known as SEVESO I Directive),
• Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-
accident hazards involving dangerous substances (known as SEVESO II 
Directive). This directive that became effective on 3rd February 1997 cancelled 
the SEVESO I Directive,
• Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, 
amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC.
2.1.1.2  The competent bodies responsible for the legislative processes and control of 
the industrial enterprises in the EU
The unified implementation and thorough fulfilment of the SEVESO III 
Directive provisions in the whole EU requires a close collaboration between the cor-
responding bodies of all member states and the European Commission. The compe-
tent bodies responsible for the major industrial accident prevention in the EU are:
• The competent institutions in the area of the major industrial accident preven-
tion (CCA)
• The UN agency – the environmental section (UNEP)
• The UN economic commission (UNECE)





2017 Explosion resulting in fire in a 
rolling element manufacturing 
plant
1 dead, 3 critically injured, 21 at 
risk, 150 000 Euros damage.
Spain 2020 Ammonia release in chemical 
establishment (upper tier)
the death of a worker, another one 
was critically injured, 15 workers 
were mildly injured
Table 1. 
The most famous industrial accidents worldwide – An overview [9, 10].
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• The office for major industrial accidents (MAHB)
2.1.1.3 The information systems of industrial accidents in the EU
The information systems of the industrial accidents are a useful tool for sup-
porting the decision-making process of prevention and also the solution of the 
major industrial accident prevention. Currently these information systems contain 







• Water penetrated the 
container of methyl iso-
cyanate with subsequent 
exothermal reaction,
• storing hazardous 
substances in large 
containers instead of in 
small barrels.
• Leakage of 20–30 tons of 
methyl isocyanate,
• 3,787 victims,
• deaths of the farm animals,
• damages approximately 20 
billion USD,
• the surroundings contami-
nated even today.
• Increasing requirements 
on safety of the opera-
tion in the developing 
countries (by the 
multinationals),
• improving the citizen 
protection against the 





• Increased temperature in 
the boiler and subsequent 
chemical reaction with 
leakage of poisonous 
gas (cloud) to the 
atmosphere.
• 37,000 people exposed to the 
toxic cloud,
• Death of 3,300 animals 
and later deaths of 78,000 
animals,
• The decontamination price - 
32 billion USD.
• Adopting the SEVESO 







• Building a barrier from 
insufficiently tough 
material,
• long-lasting strong rains 
– destabilisation of the 
barrier,
• leakage of mercury 
to the air during gold 
separation,
• combination of highly 
dangerous manufacturing 
procedures with insuffi-
cient safety provisions for 
technological procedures.
• Contamination of the rivers 
Sasal, Tisa and Danube,
• mass fish kill, deaths of other 
organisms in these rivers,
• a cross-border accident, 
Hungary required a financial 
compensation.
• Amendment of the 
SEVESO II Directive 
(including the ecologi-
cal accidents to major 
industrial accidents),
• exempting selected 
activities from the 
Mining Act and 
moving them under the 
SEVESO II Directive,
• increasing the safety 





• Failure of level gauge that 
indicated an incorrect 
petrol level,
• failures of other technical 
barriers and warning 
devices.
• Injuries of more than 40 
people,
• enormous damages of the 
company property and in the 
surroundings.
• Thorough and quality 
assessment and risk 
management with an 
emphasis on analysing 
the influence of the 
human factor,
• integrating other 
protection elements 
for limiting the 
accident (detectors and 
cameras),
• good safety culture and 
employees´ motivation.
Table 2. 
Causes and consequences of selected industrial accidents [15, 16].
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databases that concentrate data about the emergencies and participate in preventing 
similar crisis phenomena. The Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB) ensures the 
summarisation of the data form analysing the major industrial accidents in the EU. 
The MAHB provides the basic research and scientific support to the EU in the area 
of formulating, realising and monitoring the EU policies with the goal to check the 
risks of developing major industrial accidents.
The industrial accidents are gathered in the national and multinational data-
bases. The most useful databases concentrating the data about the accidents are:
• MARS (Major Accidents Reporting System) [15].
• SPIRS (Seveso Plants Information Retrieval System) [18].
• ARIA (Analyse, Recherche et Information sur les Accidents) [16].
• FACTS (Failure and Accidents Technical Information System) [17].
• ZEMA (Enterprise Data Management) [19].
The MARS database collects data about the major industrial accidents and near 
misses in the SEVESO III companies in the EU. The purpose of the database is to 
provide data for the statistic assessment with the goal to avoid development of such 
events and it also serves as a source of lessons from the accidents. Based on the in 
advance defined rules of the responsible institutions in the EU the EU member 
states provide information about the major industrial accidents and near-misses to 
the Joint Research Centre of EC in Ispra through the electronic database MARS. The 
report of the event to the MARS database is obligatory for the EU member states in 
the case of an event that fulfils the criteria of a major industrial accident presented 
in the Appendix IV of the SEVESO III Directive.
The MARS database can be utilised by the bodies of the state administration 
of the EU member states, the industrial and trade associations, Trade Unions, etc. 
Currently there is at disposal also the interactive version of the database, the so-
called eMARS version that is available at the internet.
Type of Accident
Year Major Accident Near Miss Other Event Total
2010 30 7 1 38
2011 22 0 3 25
2012 28 9 5 42
2013 21 7 5 33
2014 23 2 0 25
2015 22 4 2 28
2016 13 3 1 17
2017 12 1 1 14
2018 11 2 3 16
2019 1 0 1 2
Total 183 35 22 240
Table 3. 
Contingency table of accidents according to type and year [15].
Risk Management
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The Table 3 brings the classification according to the types of the accident and the 
year when the given type of accident developed during 2010–2019. As we can  
see the largest amount of the most serious accidents developed in 2010–2030 accidents. 
The lowest number of the major accidents was registered in 2019 – only one accident. 
However, during the last three years, not all accidents have been recorded and there-
fore the amount of the accidents can increase. The near-miss is another type of the 
accident. The highest number of the near misses was in 2012–9 accidents. The lowest 
amount of the near misses is registered in 2011 and 2019–0. However, the number can 
be changed in 2019 – similarly as in the case of the major accident. The last accident 
type is the so called another event. The highest number is recorded in the years 2012 
and 2013–5, on the other hand there was none in 2014. In 2012 we registered the high-
est amount of all the aforementioned types – 42 accidents, on the contrary the lowest 
amount was in 2019 – only two of them. Also in the case of the year 2019, the number 
of the accidents can be changed due to registering other accidents.
Another directive directly connected with the SEVESO III Directive is the SPIRS 
database (SEVESO Plants Information Retrieval System). This database gathers 
especially the data identifying the SEVESO establishments (their name, address, loca-
tion in the framework of the country’s territory, hazardous substances in the company 
and their volume, number of employees, number of citizens in the circle of 5 and 10 
kilometres, the distance from the nearest water course, the company activity, etc.).
There are several other databases worldwide gathering the data about the indus-
trial accidents. One of them is also the ARIA database formed by the Bureau for 
Analysis of Industrial Risks and Pollutions (BARPI) in 1992 by the French Ministry 
of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy [16].
The database FACTS is a functional one in the Netherlands and includes data 
about more than 23,000 industrial accidents with hazardous substances globally 
during the recent 90 years. It contains not only the accidents that happened but also 
the near-misses from the point of view of their seriousness and consequences. The 
most serious ones are processed in the form of reports that are available and provide 
a data flow for assessing the risk and preventing the failures [17].
Germany has a database for the industrial accidents called ZEMA. It comprises 
data about small accidents but also about serious ones affecting seriously the popu-
lation, environment and property [20].
2.1.1.4 Major industrial accident prevention in the Slovak Republic
The Slovak Republic is a small country; however, the industrial accidents 
occurred also in its territory. The legal framework for the major industrial accidents 
in the SEVESO III context began to be solved after the Slovak Republic had entered 
the EU in 2004. In Slovakia, there are about 80 SEVESO establishment and they are 
divided to the categories A and B [21]. Their number can be changed due to re-
categorising of the companies.
The legal regulations controlling the area of protection against the consequences 
of industrial accidents have an important place in the Slovak legal system. Their 
goal is to protect people, the environment and material values against the negative 
impacts of the industrial accidents but also other crisis phenomena connected with 
leaking hazardous substances to the air, soil or water.
The Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic is responsible for the 
preparation of the legal regulations in the area of preventing and removing the 
consequences of the industrial accidents, however, partial tasks in this area are 
also fulfilled by the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic or the Ministry of 
Economy of the Slovak Republic. Besides the legal regulations that are generally 
obligatory, there are also technical standards that are only recommended.
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The following legal regulations solve the area of the major industrial accident 
prevention:
• the law No. 128/2015 Coll. about major industrial accident prevention as 
amended and the implementing regulations that complete this law (further the 
law about the Major industrial accidents (MIA) prevention),
• the decree of the Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic No. 198/2015 
Coll. that realises some provisions of the law No. 128/2015 about major  
industrial accident prevention as amended.
There are several subjects in the area of the MIA prevention that are mutually 
interactive:
• State administration in the MIA prevention area,
• SEVESO establishments,
• Evaluators [21].
In the further text, we will characterise the individual competencies of all  
represented subjects that participate in the major industrial prevention in practice.
The most intensive collaboration takes place between the Ministry of 
Environment of the Slovak Republic, Slovak Agency of Environment and district 
offices in the seat of the regions.
According to the law about MIA prevention the companies are divided into two 
categories – the A category (the upper tier) And B category (the lower tier). The 
number is equal, it can change regarding to the re-categorisation of the companies 
from the A to the B group or including a new enterprise under the law about MIA 
prevention. The companies differ from each other especially in the area of the 
defined obligations that have to be fulfilled and the categorisation itself is realised 
according to the total number of the hazardous substances in the enterprise 
(according to the Appendix 1 in the law of MIA prevention) [21].
The threshold quantities defined in the tables in the first and second part of the 
law about MIA prevention relate to each enterprise. The quantities that are  
to be taken into account are the maximal amounts that are present or can prob-
ably be present at any moment. The hazardous substances present in the company 
amounting 2% or less than 2% of the corresponding threshold quantity are not 
taken into consideration for calculating the total present volume if their location 
in the company cannot cause any major industrial accident in another part of the 
enterprise [21].
If the company has no hazardous substance in an amount that is greater or 
equals the corresponding threshold quantity the following rule for defining the fact 
whether the company is under the law about MIA prevention is used.
The law relates to the companies of the B category, if the sum:
 3 51 2 4
1 2 3 3 5
1= + + + + +¼+ ³
x
B B B B B BX
q qq q q q
N
Q Q Q Q Q Q
  (1)
N = is the sum of the relative quantities of two or several hazardous substances 
present in the company,
Risk Management
10
qx = is the amount of the hazardous substance x (or the present hazardous 
substances of the same class/category) according to the part 1 or 2,
QBX = is the corresponding threshold quantity for the hazardous substances or 
the class/category “x” from the column 3 – part 1 or from the column 3 – part 2.
The law relates to the companies of the B category, if the sum:
 3 51 2 4
1 2 3 4 5
1= + + + + +¼+ ³
x
A A A A A AX
q qq q q q
N
Q Q Q Q Q Q
  (2)
N = is the sum of the relative quantities of two or several hazardous substances 
present in the company,
qx = is the amount of the hazardous substance x (or the present hazardous 
substances of the same class/category) according to the part 1 or 2,
QAX = is the corresponding threshold quantity for the hazardous substance or 
the class/category “x” from the column 2 – part 1 or from the column 2 – part 2 [21].
2.1.1.5 Information systems of the industrial accidents in Slovakia
Currently there are two information systems serving for registering the indus-
trial accidents in Slovakia – the Information System of MIA Prevention and the 
Information System of the Industrial Accidents. Both information systems serve for 
gathering, recording, listing, searching, utilising, saving and transferring informa-
tion about the industrial accidents in Slovakia [14].
3. Risk management of the industrial processes
The risk assessment and risk management are problematic areas in the area of 
the MIA prevention. The existence of a whole range of the systematic procedures, 
methods, techniques and software means increases the uncertainty rate for com-
paring the results of various companies in the framework of processing the safety 
documentation. Therefore the scientific and research activities in this area should 
bring new knowledge and approaches that will bring optimal solutions.
3.1  Position and importance of the risk management in the area of MIA 
prevention
The risk assessment and management is an interdisciplinary filed that is used 
in a lot of areas of the social life. Every company has to fulfil both the strategic and 
operational objectives in the individual sectors of its activity. The manufacturing 
process management, HR, management of the financial processes, quality and 
safety and a whole range of others belong here. The safety management as one of 
the non-profit company activities seems to be superfluous if there are no crisis 
phenomena until anything happens. The safety management is realised with an 
emphasis on the area of Safety and Protection of Health at Work, on the environ-
ment but also the accident prevention if we work with the hazardous substances in 
our processes. The risk assessment and management is the basis for implementing 
the preventive measures and reducing the risk of developing the crisis phenomena.
The risk assessment and management is of the key importance from the point of 
view of minimising the damages and losses of our interests. The protection of life, 
property and environment cannot be ensured without identifying the risk sources, 
11
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their analysis and assessment from the point of view of undesirable effects of the 
hazardous substance.
3.2  Approaches and systematic procedures of the risk assessment utilised in the 
companies
In general we can say that the risk management process consisting of assessing 
and managing the risks can be implemented in every area of the social life. The 
unbinding standards in the form of the ISO standards are transposed to the legal 
standards of several countries worldwide. ISO 31 000 Risk Management was issued 
in 2019 and was implemented to the individual EU member states. This process can 
be implemented for the whole organisation and all processes that are realised in its 
framework. Sometimes the organisations evaluate and manage the risks only up to 
a certain level. This standard defines several principles that are to be fulfilled for 
the process to be effective. Its main aim is the development, implementation and 
continual improvement of the framework whose purpose is to integrate the risk 
management process to the company management, to its strategy and planning 
processes, management and also to the process of reporting, policies and other 
activities.
According to STN ISO 31 000, the risk management process represents a sys-
tematic implementation of the policies, procedures and implementation of practice 
for these specific activities (see the Figure 1) [23].
The Figure 1 depicts the overall risk management process. In practice the organ-
isations manage the risks through identifying, analysing and assessing them and 
subsequently they evaluate which means to use to reduce the unacceptable risks to 
an acceptable level. During the whole process they communicate and consult with 
the interested parties and monitor the risks and then the measures that were imple-
mented. The standard used the term risk treatment; however, the MIA prevention 
area uses the term risk management.
The risk management of the industrial processes is realised especially in connec-
tion with fulfilling the legal requirements. The most frequent reason for its realisa-
tion is the employees’ protection in the framework of the safety and protection of 
health at work. It is more complicated to assess and manage the risks in the case of 
Figure 1. 
Risk management process [23].
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the accident development prevention, especially in those conditions that have to 
fulfil the requirements of the law about MIA prevention.
The risk assessment process in the industrial enterprises (according to the law 
about MIA prevention) consists of:
• identifying the dangers (risk sources) and events that can arouse a major 
industrial accident,
• quantifying the probability or frequency of the MIA development,
• estimating the extent and seriousness of the consequences on the MIA for 
people’s health, environment and property, assessing the risk and evaluating 
the risk acceptability [21].
The risk assessment as an independent phase is part of the operator’s documen-
tation in compliance with the law and therefore it is important for the company rep-
resentatives to understand this process and to be able to realise it appropriately. The 
risk assessment and management can be realised by a whole range of approaches, 
however, the idea algorithm has certain parallels. The logic of the overall procedure 
is the same almost in any environment; it is different only in the points that are 
specific for the given area. If the person (expert) that carries it out will understand 
its essence and usability, he/she is able to implement this process and to choose the 
optimal methods and techniques of the individual steps of this approach.
The following items can be utilised for the risk assessment:
• the systematic procedure,
• the method or a set of techniques,
• the mathematical calculation.
3.2.1 Systematic procedures for the risk assessment
The systematic procedures are complex algorithms that utilise the methods, 





3.3  Assessing the MIA prevention in the conditions of Slovakia and shortages 
detected
There are several problems that create a space for the scientific and research 
activity in the area of the MIA prevention. The improvement of the safety level of 
the SEVESO establishments in Slovakia by creating a complex model of the risk 
assessment of the industrial processes using the quantitative methods, with its 
harmonisation with the EU standards and subsequent implementation in the Slovak 
conditions has been the basic aim of the scientific and research activity at the FSE 
UNIZA during the recent years.
13
Risk Management in the Area of Major Industrial Accident Prevention in the EU and Slovak…
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.98406
Based on the currently valid documents and approaches that are utilised in 
practice the risk management can be divided into two basic phases as follows:
• the risk assessment,
• the risk treatment.
These both phases of the risk management are in the mutual interaction. From 
the point of view of the sequence the risk assessment has to be realised first, then 
it is necessary to reduce the unacceptable risks and subsequently to monitor the 
reduced risks and all of that represents their treatment/management.
The risk assessment can be characterised as a systematic activity of an indi-
vidual or a group of people (experts) whose main goal is to state the acceptability 
or unacceptability of the risks on the basis of criteria defined in advance. From the 
functional viewpoint we divide the risk assessment process to two phases:
• the preparatory phase,
• the realisation phase.
The preparatory phase of the risk assessment has a character of realising the deci-
sions and preparatory activities connected with this phase whose selected outputs 
are connected with the individual steps of the realisation phase of the risk assess-
ment. The realisation phase of the risk assessment is an implementation activity into 
which the data from the preparatory phase enter and then we implement the selected 
procedures, methods and techniques in the individual steps by the working group 
(evaluators) for assessing the risks of a particular process. A list of the acceptable 
and unacceptable risks that are subsequently reduced and as the residual risks they 
enter the process of monitoring the risk is created. Every phase has its steps that are 
logically interconnected. The Figure 2 depicts the whole risk assessment process.
The quality of the preparatory phase is closely connected with the quality of the 
outputs that are obtained at the end of the realisation phase. It depends especially 
on the professionalism and assumptions of the human factor (working group) that 
participates both in making decisions in individual phases or steps and realising 
the analysis itself (expert evaluation) of the given system. The human factor is also 
connected with the rate of uncertainty that enters the process and can affect the 
analysis results and cause deviations. The highest rate of uncertainty influences 
the results in the risk assessment phase due to the calculations that are part of the 
implemented methods. These deviations are connected with the rate of knowledge 
of the evaluators and the information that is available at the time of the analysis.
The complex model was one of the main outputs of the FSE UNIZA’s research 
activity. It was created on the basis of several sequential steps using methods, 
approaches and tools from other projects solved at our faculty. During its creation 
it was necessary to define the main risk management phases of the complex model 
(the risk assessment and management) and then to determine the individual steps. 
The solution process was aimed at the risk assessment phase that was then analysed 
and developed. The existing systematic procedures, methods and techniques for the 
risk assessment in the industrial environment of the Slovak Republic and worldwide 
were evaluated for the necessary identification, analysis and assessment of the risk.
Based on several assessment criteria we chose some parts and calculations of the 
systematic approach ARAMIS, QRA method, Boolean algebra, failure tree, event 
tree, etc. We utilised also the results of the tasks solved in the project framework for 
defining the input and output parameters of the model:
Risk Management
14
• analysing and synthesising the conclusions of the research of the SEVESO 
establishments in the form of the research report – Statistical Research of 
SEVESO Establishments.
• the working meetings.
We selected the methods and calculation mechanisms that were then imple-
mented in the model. The project team’s key procedure was the ARAMIS method 
that consists of two key methods – the Methodology for the Identification of Major 
Accident Hazards (MIMA) that identifies the risk sources of the major accidents 
and defines the highest risk potential of the equipment. The second method is 
called the Methodology for the Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios 
(MIRAS) that is a methodology for identifying the safety measures and procedures 
for scenarios identified by MIMAH.
The output of the whole analysis is the determination of the risk, designing 
suitable measures followed by an investment or organisational aim in the area of 
improving the operation safety.
4. Modelling the effects and impacts of the accidents
The current software tools used for modelling the effects and impacts are on a 
very good level. Their main task is to simulate (based on the models) the forma-
tion and development of the accident. These simulated accidents are subsequently 
Figure 2. 
Basic phases and steps of the risk assessment.
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included to the map material which can show us the impact of the accident in 
dependence on time and quantity. Thanks to these software means it is possible 
to identify the negative effects of the accidents and take the necessary preventive 
measures. These simulation programmes work with various databases thanks to 
which we can simulate the accidents as realistically as possible.
However, it is necessary to say this software cannot create a fully accurate model 
of the real world and define all parameters, e.g. the structure of the terrain, location 
of the buildings and equipment, etc.
Today there are a lot of simulation programmes determined for simulating the 
accidents, e.g. ALOHA, EFFECTS, BREEZE, TEREX, ROZEX, SAVE II, etc. They can 
be used for various types of accidents – the simulation of explosions, fires, leakages of 
hazardous substances to the air, evaporation of the hazardous substances, etc. [28, 29].
In the Czech Republic they most frequently utilise the simulation programme 
EFFECTS but the programmes ALOHA and SAVE II are also used. Only exception-
ally they make use of the programmes TEREX and ROZEX. On the contrary, in 
Slovakia we often utilise ALOHA.
For simulating the type scenario in the emergency plan framework we chose 
the software ALOHA, particularly the version 5.4.7. The faculty student Lukáš 
Dančo participated in realising this simulation. The software simulated a leakage 
of a hazardous substance from a storage container. The software MARPLOT that is 
directly connected with ALOHA was subsequently used as a map basis for transfer-
ring the graphical outputs from ALOHA and thus for depicting the expansion of the 
hazardous substance fumes.
The particular company deals with manufacturing the basic chemicals and 
chemical products and its basic products are the essential amino-acids. Based on 
exceeding the threshold value of the hazardous substance present in the company, it 
belongs to the B SEVESO category.
Particularly, it is the hazardous substance ammonium hydroxide – the ammonia.
The ammonia stored in this company has a concentration higher than 25%. It 
presents a risk for the life and health of people only in the case of leaking from the 
storage containers or pipelines due to releasing the gaseous ammonia bound in 
water. The gaseous ammonia or the anhydrous ammonia (according to the law about 
MIA prevention) is the hazardous substance mentioned in the law in the Appendix 
1, part 2. The substance is dangerous based on its classification as the toxic and 
ecotoxic material.
It is a caustic liquid with bad smell. Its colour range is from colourless to yellow 
or slightly turbid. This substance causes failures of the central nervous system and 
irritates mainly the respiratory system. The gaseous ammonia released from this 
liquid can be easily recognised already in a low concentration thanks to its strong 
odour. The exposure to a high concentration of the gaseous ammonia can cause the 
respiratory arrests.
The leakage of this hazardous substance can develop either in the storage con-
tainers or during pumping the hazardous substance from the tank truck. We aim at 
the storage containers, particularly at one of the containers, during the simulation 
of the hazardous substance.
We chose this device due to the fact it is the only storaging object in the company 
with a larger amount of the hazardous substance and it is the most dangerous 
equipment in the enterprise.
4.1 Input data
For us to be able to simulate the type scenarios we needed to define the input 
data in the software. The data about the territory were defined on the basis of the 
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approximate position of the hazardous equipment. It is a locality in the Banská 
Bystrica region with an altitude of 370 metres above the sea level. The time and date 
of the emergency was fictitious only for the needs of the simulation – 14th May 
2020 at 11:00 am (Table 4).
4.2 Simulating the hazardous substance leakage by software ALOHA
Our simulation of the emergency scenario took into account the formation 
of a crack on the surface of one of the containers causing a leakage of the whole 
volume of the ammonium hydroxide (63 m3) to the emergency tank (280 m3) 
during two minutes. Therefore we simulated the emergency scenario as the 
spill evaporation from the emergency tank (280 m3) on the basis of the defined 
atmospheric data.
However, it is necessary to say it was not possible to define the atmospheric data 
accurately as the emergency tank is located under the terrain level and this fact can 
affect the spreading of the gaseous ammonia. The surrounding buildings and ter-
rain are not accurately defined in the simulation and it can also affect the spreading 
of the gaseous ammonia [30].
Input Data
Data about Territory
Locality Banská Bystrica region
Altitude 370 m above sea level
North latitude 48°44´ N
East latitude 19°14′ E
Date of accident 14th May 2020
Time of accident 11:00
Chemical Data





Height of measuring the wind speed 10 m







Size of the spill 280 m2
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Based on the defined input data from the Table 3 the software ALOHA graphi-
cally assessed the safe zones with a different concentration of the hazardous 
substance – see the Figure 3.
For us to understand the designations better, the following text describes the 
individual effects in the case of exposures to the hazardous substance to one of 
the zones.
ERPG 1 – Under this concentration the exposed persons can expect a low, 
insignificant and temporarily fugitive effect to their health within one hour or to 
perceive a clearly defined odour.
ERPG2 - Under this concentration the exposed persons can expect an irrevers-
ible effect to their health within one hour or less or any symptom that would reduce 
their ability to realise their personal protection.
ERPG 3 - Under this concentration the exposed persons can expect life-threat-
ening effects to their health within one hour [3].
The abbreviation ppm means the amount of the volume parts of the given 
hazardous substance per million volume parts of the air.
Subsequently these graphical ALOHA outputs were transferred to the map 
material through the programme MARPLOT for the direction and reach of spread-
ing the hazardous substance from the leakage source to be depicted. This depiction 
can be seen in the Figure 4.
The Figure 4 shows the zone of the direct threat in the framework of which 
the persons can be exposed to the life-threatening effects can be found only in the 
operator’s premises or it can partially hit the areas of the surrounding area. The 
next threat-zone covers several buildings with the services for the citizens. They 
are especially the bus stop, public road and staff quarters - here we can assume the 
occurrence of people. The last yellow zone covers only the uninhabited area where 
no people’s occurrence is assumed. The Table 5 shows the assumed distance of the 
reach of the threat-zones.
Our model example processed in the software ALOHA presents our attempt to 
show the risk of the leakage of ammonium hydroxide from the storaging premises 
in the company. Based on the assigned parameters we worked out a type scenario 
of leaking the toxic fumes of this hazardous substance. However, as it has been 
already mentioned, the software is not able to model certain parameters that would 
affect the spreading of the toxic fume – e.g. the terrain or the building layout. 
Figure 3. 
A graphical depiction of the dangerous zones with the given concentration of the hazardous substance [30].
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Certain safety systems in the company are to be taken into account, e.g. detecting 
the hazardous substance leakage, warning the employees in the case of the leakage 
and their subsequent immediate evacuation from the threatened surroundings, 
etc. Besides these facts there are also the emergency units that are able to affect the 
spreading process by their immediate response.
Based on the emergency scenario and the aforementioned facts which are not 
involved in the type scenario we can assume that the leaked toxic fume of the 
ammonium hydroxide should not exceed the company premises and to threaten 
the persons in the plant surroundings. We do not assume any impacts on the health 
of the persons and employees in the company due to their preparedness for such a 
scenario.
This type scenario was worked out for the needs of depicting the simulation 
possibilities in the software ALOHA.
5. Discussion and conclusion
Based on the analysis of the risk assessment approaches and type scenarios in the 
selected EU countries it is possible to say:
• The idea that on the basis of the identified risks in the industrial processes it is 
necessary to determine the protection zone for the population, its property and 
Figure 4. 
The reach of the toxic fumes in the map [30].
Threat-zones
Red ERPG – 3 1500 ppm 144 metres
Orange ERPG – 2 150 ppm 487 metres
Yellow ERPG – 1 25 ppm 1,300 metres
Table 5. 
The distances of the threat zones.
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the environment for the case of the MIA is essentially the same in the whole 
EU. However, the approach of determining these zones is different.
• The analysis identified the selected member countries utilised various 
approaches to this area. Particularly they are the approaches based on the 
consequences/impacts, the approaches based more on the probability or on a 
combination of these two approaches.
• Each country has different criteria for the risk assessment and for determining 
the threat zones. It would be suitable to compare these approaches and to assess 
them on the EU level and subsequently to choose one approach which would be 
compulsory and the countries would implement it to their legal environment.
We would like to recommend utilising one type of software for modelling and 
simulating the type scenarios in all EU member states. Although the majority of 
the software process is based on the basic physical dispersion models, their outputs 
and thus the distances of the threat zones are frequently not identical. The ALOHA 
software is a complex tool.
The MIA prevention is one of the assumptions of ensuring the civil safety in the 
framework of the expanding technological development. The number and effects 
of the hazardous substances change permanently and therefore the risk assessment 
and the subsequent risk treatment/management in the industrial processes is the 
basic prevention principle. The MIA prevention is a complex and interdisciplinary 
area that is involved both in the European directives and in the regulations of the 
EU member states that transpose these requirements to their legal environment. In 
fact it is a tool that is an important attribute during processing the safety documen-
tation of the SEVESO establishment.
Our complex model is based on the routine procedures and provides a broader 
interface for its implementation. Its verification confirmed the possibility to utilise 
the methodology especially in the SEVESO establishment by the specialist for the 
MIA prevention [32, 33]. In spite of the fact, the new law does not define a unified 
methodology of the risk assessment; the effort of the EU is oriented on creating 
a unified approach. The advantage of such a procedure would be the possibility 
of comparing the results of the SEVESO establishments if the same methodology 
was used.
The main benefit of this article is a complex analysis of the MIA prevention that 
is created by the legal environment (regulations and technical standards), by the 
participating parties (the state administration bodies, SEVESO establishments, 
etc.). The processes that are under way (the managerial and technical ones) and 
the methods and tools that are utilised (the information systems, methods and 
techniques of the risk assessment, etc.) both from the EU and the Slovak Republic’s 
point of view. The area of the MIA prevention system is analysed and summarised 
in this work for the first time since the adoption of the new SEVESO III Directive 
and the subsequent adoption of the new law about the MIA prevention (2015) in the 
Slovak Republic.
5.1 Study limitations, implication and future research directions
Our main aim in this study was to show the importance of the MIA prevention. 
In spite of the fact the preventive measures are increased, its amount does not 
decrease and it can be caused mainly by the increasing number of the enterprises 
and the hazardous substances (the new ones) used. The prevention improvement 





University of Zilina, Faculty of Security Engineering, Zilina, Slovakia
*Address all correspondence to: katarina.holla@fbi.uniza.sk
public in its close surroundings more effective [31–33]. The company is able to pro-
cess the risk assessment and subsequently to model it into the visual form better by 
using the structured procedures and utilising the available software (e.g. ALOHA).
The insufficient information occurring in individual database systems is the pos-
sible limitation. The identified causes of the accident and its consequences are often 
processed insufficiently and it is impossible to identify them. The limitation of the 
ALOHA system is the extent of its utilisation in the area of spreading the hazardous 
substances and it is a problem to model the fires and explosions.
Regarding to the created procedures for the risk assessment it would be suitable 
to integrate the calculation mechanisms to individual steps of the risk assessment. 
It would be also suitable to aim at utilising the tree methods for determining the 
causes and effects, especially by using the bow-tie diagrams. Another opportunity 
is also to create the corresponding methods of the risk assessment for the domino 
effects or zoning and permission activities.
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